2 hours 15 minutes 35 seconds
🇬🇧 English
Speaker 1
00:00
The lesson I would want everyone to take from the story of the First World War is that human life is not cheap. That all of the warring powers thought that just by throwing more men and more material at the front, they would solve their political problems with military force. And at the end of the day in 1918, 1 side did win that, but it didn't actually solve any of those political problems.
Speaker 2
00:35
You said that World War I gave birth to the surveillance state in the US. Can you explain? The following is a conversation with Christopher Capozzola, a historian at MIT specializing in the history of politics and war in modern American history, especially about the role of World War I in defining the trajectory of the United States and our human civilization in the 20th and 21st centuries.
Speaker 2
01:02
This is the Lux Friedman Podcast. To support it, please check out our sponsors in the description. And now, dear friends, here's Christopher Cappuzzola. Let's start with a big and difficult question.
Speaker 2
01:14
How did World War I start?
Speaker 1
01:16
On the 1 hand, World War I started because of a series of events in the summer of 1914 that brought sort of the major powers of Europe into conflict with 1 another. But I actually think it's more useful to say that World War I started at least a generation earlier when rising powers, particularly Germany, started devoting more and more of their resources toward military affairs and naval affairs. This sets off an arms race in Europe, it sets off a rivalry over the colonial world and who will control the resources in Africa and Asia.
Speaker 1
01:54
And so by the time you get to the summer of 1914, and in a lot of ways I say the war has already begun, and this is just the match that lights the flame.
Speaker 2
02:02
So the capacity for war was brewing within like the leaders and within the populace. They started accepting sort of slowly through the culture propagated this idea that we can go to war, it's a good idea to go to war, it's a good idea to expand and dominate others, that kind of thing. Maybe not put in those clear terms, but just the sense that military action is the way that nations operate at the global scale?
Speaker 1
02:34
Yes, yes and, right? So yes, there's a sense that the military can be the solution to political conflict in Europe itself. And the and is that war and military conflict are already happening, right?
Speaker 1
02:47
That there's war, particularly in Africa, in North Africa, in the Middle East, in the Balkans, conflict is already underway. And the European powers haven't faced off against each other. They've usually faced off against an asymmetrical conflict against much less powerful states. But in some ways that war is already underway.
Speaker 2
03:09
So do you think it was inevitable? Because World War I is brought up as a case study where it seems like a few accidental leaders and a few accidental events, or 1 accidental event led to the war. And if you change that 1 little thing, it could have avoided the war.
Speaker 2
03:28
Your sense is the drums of war have been beating for quite a while and it would have happened almost no matter what or very likely to have happened.
Speaker 1
03:38
Yes, historians never like to say things are inevitable and certainly, you know, there were people who could have chosen a different path both in the short term and the long term. But fundamentally, there were irreconcilable conflicts in the system of empires in the world in 1914. I can't see, you know, it didn't have to be this war, but it probably had to be a war.
Speaker 2
04:02
So there was the German Empire, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, there's France and Great Britain, could the USP call that empire at that moment yet? When do you graduate to empire status?
Speaker 1
04:17
Well, certainly after 1898 with the acquisition of the former territories of the Spanish Empire, the United States has formal colonial possessions and it has sort of mindsets of rule and military acquisition that would define empire in a kind of more informal sense.
Speaker 2
04:34
So you would say you would put the blame or the responsibility of starting World War I into the hands of the German empire and Kaiser Wilhelm II.
Speaker 1
04:45
You know, that's a really tough call to make. And, you know, that deciding that is going to keep historians in business for the next 200 years. I think there are people who would lay all of the blame on the Germans, right, and you know, who would point toward a generation of arms buildup, you know, alliances that Germany made and promises that they made to their allies in the Balkans, to the Austro-Hungarians.
Speaker 1
05:17
And so yes, there's an awful lot of responsibility there. There has been a trend lately to say, no, it's no one's fault, right, that, you know, that all of the various powers literally were sleepwalking into the war, right, They backed into it inadvertently. I think that lets everyone a little too much off the hook. Right?
Speaker 1
05:38
And so I think in between is, you know, I would put the blame on the system of empires itself, on the system. But in that system, the actor that sort of carries the most responsibility is definitely Imperial Germany.
Speaker 2
05:52
So the leader of Austro-Hungarian Empire, Franz Josef I, his nephew is Archduke Franz Ferdinand. He was assassinated. And so that didn't have to lead to a war.
Speaker 2
06:10
And then the leader of the German Empire, Kaiser Wilhelm II, pressured, sort of started talking trash, and boiling the water that ultimately resulted in the explosion, plus all the other players. So can you describe the dynamics of how that unrolled? What US, what's the role of US, what's the role of France, what's the role of Great Britain, Germany and also Hungarian Empire?
Speaker 1
06:41
Yeah, over the course of about 4 weeks, right, following the assassination of the Archduke in Sarajevo. It sort of triggers a series of political conflicts and ultimately ultimatums sort of demanding sort of that 1 or other power sort of stand down in response to the demands of either Britain, France, or in turn, Germany or Russia, at the same time that those alliances kind of trigger automatic responses from the other side. And so it escalates.
Speaker 1
07:17
And once that escalation is combined with the call up of military troops, then none of those powers wants to be sort of the last 1 to kind of get ready for conflict. So even throughout it, They think they are getting ready in a defensive maneuver. And they think if there is conflict, well, it might be a skirmish. It might be sort of a standoff.
Speaker 1
07:42
It could be solved with diplomacy later, because diplomacy is failing now. That turns out not to be the case. Diplomacy fails, it's not a skirmish, it becomes a massive war. And the Americans are watching all of this from the sidelines.
Speaker 1
07:56
They have very little influence over what happens that summer.
Speaker 2
07:59
How does it go from a skirmish between a few nations to a global war? Is there a place where there's a phase transition?
Speaker 1
08:08
Yeah, I think the phase transition is over the course of the fall of 1914, when The Germans make an initial sort of bold move into France. In many ways, they're fighting the last war, the Franco-Prussian War of 1870. And they really do sort of, you know, kind of want to have a quick sort of lightning strike in some ways against France to kind of bring the war to a speedy conclusion.
Speaker 1
08:38
France turns out to be able to fight back more effectively than the Germans expected and then the battle lines sort of harden. And then behind that, the French and the Germans, as well as the British on the side of the French, start digging in, literally, right? And digging trenches, trenches that at first are, you know, 3 feet deep to, you know, to avoid shelling from artillery, then become 6 feet, 10 feet deep, 2 miles wide, that include telegraph wires, that include whole hospitals in the back. And then at that point, the front is locked in place and the only way to break that is sort of basically dialing the war up to 11, right?
Speaker 1
09:25
So massive numbers of troops, massive efforts, none of which work, right? And so the war is stuck in this, but that's the phase transition right there. What were the machines of war in that case? You mentioned trenches.
Speaker 2
09:41
What were the guns used? What was the size of guns? What are we talking about?
Speaker 2
09:46
What did Germany start accumulating that led up to this war?
Speaker 1
09:51
1 of the things that we see immediately is the industrial revolution of the previous 30 or 40 years brought to bear on warfare, right? And so you see sort of machine guns, you see artillery, you know, these are the kind of the key weapons of war on both sides, right? The vast majority of battlefield casualties are from artillery shelling from 1 side to another, not rifle or even machine gun attacks.
Speaker 1
10:25
In some ways, the weapons of war are human beings, right? Tens of thousands of them poured over the top in these sort of waves to kind of try to break through the enemy lines. And it would work for a little while, but holding the territory that had been gained often proved to be even more demanding than gaining it. And so often, each side would retreat back into the trenches and wait for another day.
Speaker 1
10:53
And how did Russia,
Speaker 2
10:56
how did Britain, how did France get pulled into the war? I suppose the France 1 is the easy 1. But what is the order of events here?
Speaker 2
11:06
How it becomes a global war.
Speaker 1
11:08
Yeah, so Britain, France, and Russia are at this time, and they're in alliance. And so the conflicts in the summer of 1914 that lead to the declarations of war happen 1 after another in late August of 1914. And all 3 powers essentially come in at the same time because they have promised to do so through a series of alliances conducted secretly in the years before 1914 that committed them to defend 1 another.
Speaker 1
11:42
Germany, Austria, Hungary, and the Ottoman Empire have their own set of secret agreements that also commit them to defend 1 another. And what this does is it sort of brings them all into conflict at the exact same moment. They're also, for many of these countries, bringing not just their national armies, but also their empires into the conflict, right? So Britain and France, of course, have enormous sort of global empires that begin mobilizing soldiers as well as raw materials.
Speaker 1
12:13
Germany has less of an overseas empire. Russia and the Ottoman Empire, of course, have their own sort of hinterland within the empire. And very soon, all of the warring powers are bringing the entire world into the conflict.
Speaker 2
12:28
Did they have a sense of how deadly the war is? I mean, this is another scale of death and destruction.
Speaker 1
12:36
At the beginning, no, but very quickly. The scale of the devastation of these sort of massive over-the-top attacks on the trenches is apparent to the military officers, and it very quickly becomes apparent even at home. There is of course censorship of the battlefields and specific details don't reach people, but for civilians in any of the warring powers, they know fairly soon how destructive the war is.
Speaker 1
13:05
And to me, that's always been a real sort of puzzle, right? So that by the time the United States comes to decide whether to join the war in 1917, they know exactly what they're getting into, right? They're not backing into the war in the ways that the European powers did. You know, they've seen the devastation, they've seen photographs, they've seen injured soldiers, and they make that choice anyway.
Speaker 2
13:30
When you say they, do you mean the leaders of the people? Did the death and destruction reach the minds of the American people by that time?
Speaker 1
13:43
Yes, absolutely. You know, we don't in 1917 have the mass media that we have now, but there are images in newspapers, there are newsreels that play at the movie theaters, and of course, some of it is sanitized, but that combined with press accounts, often really quite descriptive press accounts, gory accounts, reached anyone who cared to read them. Certainly plenty of people didn't follow the news, felt it was far away, but most Americans who cared about the news knew how devastating this war was.
Speaker 2
14:18
Yeah, there's something that happens that I recently visited Ukraine for a few weeks. There's something that happens with the human mind as you get away from the actual front where the bullets are flying, like literally 1 kilometer away, you start to not feel the war. You'll hear an explosion, you'll see an explosion, you start to like get assimilated to it or you start to get used to it.
Speaker 2
14:46
And then when you get as far away from like currently what is Kiev, you start to, you know the war's going on, everybody around you is fighting in that war, but it's still somehow distant, and I think with the United States, with the ocean between, even if you have the stories everywhere, it still is somehow distant, like the way a movie is. Maybe, yeah, like a movie or a video game, it's somewhere else, even if your loved ones are going, or you are going to fight.
Speaker 1
15:19
Yeah, that is absolutely the case. And in some ways that's true even for the home fronts in Europe, except for the areas where, in Belgium and France, where the war is right there in your backyard. For other people, yeah, there's a distance.
Speaker 1
15:33
Soldiers, of course, feel this very strongly. When they, European soldiers, when they're able to go home on leave, often deeply resent what they see as the luxury that civilians are living in during the war.
Speaker 2
15:49
So how did US enter the war? Who was the president? What was the dynamics involved?
Speaker 2
15:57
And could it have stayed out?
Speaker 1
16:00
To answer your last question first, yes, right? That the United States could have stayed out of the First World War as a military power. The United States could not have ignored the war completely, right?
Speaker 1
16:14
It shaped everything, right? It shaped trade, it shaped goods and services, agriculture, you know, whether there was a crop coming, whether there were immigrants coming across the Atlantic to work in American factories, right? So the U.S. Can't ignore the war, but the U.S.
Speaker 1
16:31
Makes a choice in 1917 to enter the war by declaring war on Germany and Austria. And in that sense, this is a war of choice, but it's kicked off by a series of events. So President Woodrow Wilson has been president through this entire period of time. He has just run in the 1916 presidential election on a campaign to keep the United States out of war.
Speaker 1
17:01
But then in early 1917, the Germans in some ways sort of twist the Americans' arms, right? The Germans' sort of high command comes to understand that, you know, that they're stuck, right? That they, you know, they're stuck in this trench warfare, they need a big breakthrough. Their 1 big chance is to break the blockade, to push through that the British have imposed on them, to break through against France.
Speaker 1
17:31
And so they do. And along with this, they start sinking ships on the Atlantic, including American ships. The Germans know full well this will draw the United States into war. But the Germans look at the United States at this moment, a relatively small army, a relatively small Navy, a country that at least on paper is deeply divided about whether to join the war.
Speaker 1
17:55
And so they say, let's do it, right? They're not gonna get any American soldiers there in time. Right, You know, it was a gamble, but I think probably their best chance. They took that gamble, they lost, right?
Speaker 1
18:10
In part because French resistance was strong, in part because Americans mobilized much faster and in much greater numbers than the Germans thought they would.
Speaker 2
18:19
So the American people were divided.
Speaker 1
18:21
American people were absolutely divided about whether to enter this war, right? From 1914 to 1917, there is a searing debate across the political spectrum. It doesn't break down easily on party lines about whether it was in the US interest to do this, whether American troops should be sent abroad, whether Americans would end up just being cannon fodder for the European empires.
Speaker 1
18:47
Eventually, as American ships are sunk, first in the Lusitania in 1915, then in much greater numbers in 1917, the tide starts to turn and Americans feel that our response is necessary. And the actual declaration of war in Congress is pretty lopsided, but it's not unanimous by any means.
Speaker 2
19:08
Lopsided towards entering the war.
Speaker 1
19:11
Yeah, yeah.
Speaker 2
19:13
Well, that's really interesting because there's echoes of that in later wars where Congress seems to, nobody wants to be the guy that says no to war for some reason. Once you sense that, in terms of, sorry, in terms of politicians, because then you appear weak, but I wonder if that was always the case. So you make the case that World War I is largely responsible for defining what it means to be an American citizen.
Speaker 2
19:47
So in which way does it define the American citizen?
Speaker 1
19:51
When you think about citizenship, what it means is 2 things. First of all, what are your rights and obligations? What is sort of the legal citizenship that you have as a citizen of the United States or any other state.
Speaker 1
20:05
And the second is a more amorphous definition of like, what does it mean to belong, right? To be part of America, right? To feel American, to, you know, to love it or hate it or be willing to die for it, right? And both of those things really are crystal clear in terms of their importance during the war, right?
Speaker 1
20:24
So both of those things are on the table, being a citizen who is a citizen, who isn't matters. So people who had never carried passports or anything before suddenly have to, but also what it means to be an American, right? To feel like it, to be part of this project is also kind of being defined and enforced during World War I.
Speaker 2
20:46
So Project, you know, is a funny way to put a global war, right? So can you tell the story, perhaps that's a good example of it, of the James Montgomery Flagg's 1916 poster that reads, I want you. A lot of people know this poster, I think in its original form, in its meme-ified form, I don't know, but we know this poster and we don't know where it came from, or most Americans, I think, me included, didn't know where it came from, and it actually comes from 1916.
Speaker 2
21:20
Does this poster represent the birth of something new in America, which is a commodification or, I don't know, that propaganda machine that says what it means to be an American is somebody that fights for their country.
Speaker 1
21:40
Yeah, so the image, it's in fact, I think 1 of the most recognizable images, not only in the United States, but in the entire world, right? And you could, you can bring it almost anywhere on earth in 2022, and people will know what it refers to, right? And so this is an image that circulated first as a magazine cover, later as a recruitment poster, where the figure is Uncle Sam, sort of pointing at the viewer with his finger, sort of pointing and saying, I want you.
Speaker 1
22:10
Right, and the I want you is a recruitment tool to join the US Army. And this image, you know, really kind of starts as a kind of, like I said, a magazine cover in 1916 by the artist James Montgomery Flagg. It initially appears under the heading, What are you doing for preparedness? Meaning to prepare in case war comes to the United States.
Speaker 1
22:33
And at that point in 1916, we're still neutral. In 1917, it's turned into a US Army recruiting poster. And then it reappears in World War II, reappears generations after, you know, like you said, it's now, gets remixed, meme-ified, it's all over the place. I think, for me, it's a turning point, it's a sort of window into American culture at a crucial moment in our history, where the federal government is now embarking on a war overseas that's going to make enormous demands on its citizens.
Speaker 1
23:10
And at the same time, where sort of technologies of mass production and mass media, and what we would probably call propaganda are being sort of mobilized for the first time in this new kind of way.
Speaker 2
23:24
Well, in some sense, is it fair to say that the empire is born, the expanding empire is born from the Noam Chomsky perspective kind of empire that seeks to have military influence elsewhere in the world.
Speaker 1
23:42
Yes, but I think as historians, we need to be at least as interested in what happens to the people who are getting pointed to by Uncle Sam, right, rather than just the 1, whether he's pointing at us. And so, yes, he's asking us to do that, but how do we respond?
Speaker 2
24:00
And the people responded. So the people are ultimately the machines of history, the mechanisms of history. It's not the Uncle Sam.
Speaker 2
24:09
Sam can only do so much if the people aren't willing to step up.
Speaker 1
24:13
Absolutely. And the American people responded for sure, but they didn't build what Uncle Sam asked them to do in that poster, right? And I think that's, you know, kind of a crucial aspect that, you know, there never would have been sort of global US power without the response that begins in World War I.
Speaker 2
24:31
What was the Selective Service Act of 1917?
Speaker 1
24:35
So 1 of the very first things that Uncle Sam wants you to do, right, is to register for selective service, for the draft, right? And the law is passed very soon after the US enters the war. It's sort of demanding that all men, first between 21 and 30, then between 18 and 45, register for the draft, and they'll be selected by a government agency, by a volunteer organization.
Speaker 1
25:00
So it's
Speaker 2
25:00
a requirement to sign up.
Speaker 1
25:02
It is a legal requirement to register. Of course, not everyone who registers is selected, but over the course of the war, 24 million men register, almost 4 million serve in some fashion.
Speaker 2
25:14
What was the response? What was the feeling amongst the American people to have to sign up to the Selective Service Act? Have to register.
Speaker 1
25:24
This is a bigger turning point than we might think. In some ways, this is a tougher demand of the American public than entering the war. It's 1 thing to declare war on Germany, right?
Speaker 1
25:35
It's another thing to go down to your local post office and fill out the forms that allow your own government to send you there to fight. And this is especially important at a time when the federal government doesn't really have any other way to find you, unless you actually go and register yourself, right? And so, ordinary people are participating in the building of this war machine, but at least a half a million of them don't, right? And simply never fill out the forms, move from 1 town to another.
Speaker 2
26:08
But you said 20 million did? 20 something?
Speaker 1
26:10
Yeah, about 24 million register, at least 500,000.
Speaker 2
26:14
Is it surprising to you that that many registered since the country was divided?
Speaker 1
26:19
It is, and that's what I sort of tried to dig in to figure out how did you get 24 million people to register for the draft, and it's certainly not coming from the top down, right? You know, there may be 100 sort of agents in what's now called the FBI. It's certainly not being enforced from Washington.
Speaker 1
26:38
It's being enforced through the eyes of everyday neighbors, through community surveillance, all kinds of ways.
Speaker 2
26:47
Oh, so there was like a pressure.
Speaker 1
26:49
There's a lot of pressure. Interesting.
Speaker 2
26:52
So there was not a significant like anti-war movement as you would see maybe later with Vietnam and things like this.
Speaker 1
27:01
There was a significant movement before 1917, but it becomes very hard to keep up an organized anti-war movement after that, particularly when the government starts shutting down protests.
Speaker 2
27:13
So as the Selective Service Act of 1917 runs up against some of the freedoms, some of the rights that are defined in our founding documents. What was that clash like? What was sacrificed?
Speaker 2
27:31
What freedoms and rights were sacrificed in this process?
Speaker 1
27:35
I mean, I think on some level, the fundamental right is liberty, right? That conscription sort of demands, you know, sacrifice on the behalf of some, for notionally, for the protection of all.
Speaker 2
27:50
So even if you're against the war, you're forced to fight.
Speaker 1
27:53
Yes, and there were small provisions for conscientious objectors, solely those who had religious objections to all war, right? Not political objections to this war. And so, you know, several thousand were able to take those provisions, but even then, they faced social sanction, they faced ridicule, some of them faced intimidation.
Speaker 1
28:17
You know, So those liberty interests, both individual freedom, religious freedom, those are some of the first things to go.
Speaker 2
28:25
So what about freedom of speech? Was there silencing of the press, of the voices, of the different people that were object.
Speaker 1
28:34
Yes, absolutely. Right, and so very soon after the Selective Service Act is passed, then you get the Espionage Act, which of course is back in
Speaker 2
28:42
the news in 2022. What's the Espionage Act?
Speaker 1
28:45
The Espionage Act is a sort of omnibus bill. It contains about 10 or different provisions, very few of which have to do with espionage. But 1 key provision basically makes it illegal to say or do anything that would interfere with military recruitment.
Speaker 1
29:01
And that provision is used to shut down radical publications to shut down German language publications. And this really has a chilling impact on speech during the war.
Speaker 2
29:14
Could you put into words what it means to be an American citizen that is in part sparked by World War I. So what does that mean? Somebody that should be willing to sacrifice certain freedoms to fight for their country.
Speaker 2
29:35
Somebody that's willing to fight to spread freedom elsewhere in the world, spread the American ideals. Does that begin to tell the story of what it means to be an American?
Speaker 1
29:49
I think what we see is a change, right? So citizenship during World War I now includes the obligation to defend the country, right? To serve, right?
Speaker 1
30:01
And to, if asked, to die for it, right? And we certainly see that, and I think we see the close linkage of military service and U.S. Citizenship coming out of this time period. But, you know, when you start making lots of demands on people to fulfill obligations, in turn, they're gonna start demanding rights.
Speaker 1
30:22
And we start to see, not necessarily during the war, but after, more demands for free speech protections, more demands for equality, for marginalized groups. And so obligations and rights are sort of developing in a dynamic relationship.
Speaker 2
30:38
Oh, it's almost like an overreach of power sparked a sense like, oh crap, we can't trust centralized power to drag us into a war. We need to be able to. So there's the birth of that tension between the government and the people.
Speaker 1
30:56
It's a rebirth of it. Of course, that tension's always there, but in its modern form, I think it comes from this. Re-intensification of it.
Speaker 2
31:04
Yeah. So what about, you said that World War I gave birth to the surveillance state in the US. Can you explain?
Speaker 1
31:11
Yeah, so the Espionage Act, you know, sort of empowers federal organizations to watch other Americans. They are particularly interested in anyone who is obstructing the draft, anyone who is trying to kind of organize labor or strikes or radical movements, and anyone who might have sympathy for Germany, which basically means all German Americans come under surveillance. Initially, this is very small scale, but soon every government agency gets involved from the Treasury Department's Secret Service to the Post Office, which is sort of reading mail, to the Justice Department, which mobilizes 200,000 volunteers.
Speaker 1
31:55
You know, it's a really significant enterprise. Much of it goes away after the war, but of all the things that go away, this core of the surveillance state is the thing that persists most fully.
Speaker 2
32:08
Is this also a place where government, the size of government starts to grow in these different organizations? Or maybe it creates a momentum for growth of government?
Speaker 1
32:19
Oh, it's exponential growth, right? That over the course of the war, by almost any metric you use, right? The size of the federal budget, the number of federal employees, the number of soldiers in the standing army, all of those things skyrocket during the war.
Speaker 1
32:36
They go down after the war, but they never go down to what they were before.
Speaker 2
32:41
And probably gave a momentum for growth over time.
Speaker 1
32:44
Yes, Absolutely.
Speaker 2
32:47
Did World War I give birth to the military industrial complex in the United States? So, war profiteering, expanding of the war machine in order to financially benefit a lot of parties involved?
Speaker 1
33:05
So I guess I would maybe break that into 2 parts, right? That on the 1 hand, yes, there is war profiteering. There are investigations of it.
Speaker 1
33:19
In the years after the war, there's a widespread concern that the profit motive had played too much of a part in the war, and that's definitely the case. But I think when you try to think of this term military-industrial complex, it's best to think of it as, at what point does the 1 side lock in the other? That military choices are shaped by industry objectives and vice versa. And I don't think that that was fully locked into place during World War I.
Speaker 1
33:52
I think that's really a Cold War phenomenon when the United States is on this intense kind of footing for 2 generations in a row.
Speaker 2
34:00
So industrial is really important there, there is companies. So before then, weapons of war were created, were funded directly by the government. Were like, who was manufacturing the weapons of war?
Speaker 1
34:15
They were generally manufactured by private industry. There were, of course, arsenals, sort of 19th century iterations where the government would produce its own weapons, partly to make sure that they got what they wanted. But most of the weapons of war for all of the European powers and the United States are produced by private industry.
Speaker 2
34:37
So why do you say that the military industrial complex didn't start then? What was the important thing that happened in the Cold War?
Speaker 1
34:45
I think 1 way to think about it is the Cold War is a point at which it switches from being a dial to a ratchet, right? So during World War I, you know, the relationship between the military and industry dials up, you know, fast and high and stays, you know, stays that way and it dials back down. Whereas during the Cold War, sort of the relationship between the 2 often looks more like a ratchet.
Speaker 1
35:12
It goes up. It becomes unstoppable.
Speaker 2
35:13
It goes up again. In the way that you start, I think, the way the military industrial complex is often involved, discussed as a system that is unstoppable. Like it expands, it almost, I mean, if you take a very cynical view, it creates war so that it can make money.
Speaker 2
35:41
It doesn't just find places where it can help through military conflict, it creates tensions that directly or indirectly lead to military conflict that it can then fuel and make money from.
Speaker 1
35:56
That is certainly 1 of the concerns of both people, you know, who are critical of the First World War and then also of Dwight Eisenhower, right, when he's president and sort of in his farewell address where he sort of introduces the term military-industrial complex. And some of it is about the profit motive, but some of it is a fear that Eisenhower had that no 1 had an interest in stopping this, right? And that no 1 had a voice in stopping it and that the ordinary American could really do nothing to sort of, you know, to kind of, to dial things down.
Speaker 2
36:32
Is it strange to you that we don't often hear that kind of speech today, with like Eisenhower speaking about the military industrial complex? So for example, we'll have people criticizing the spending on war efforts, but they're not discussing the machinery of the military industrial complex, like the basic way that human nature works, where we get ourselves trapped in this thing. They're saying like there's better things to spend money on versus describing a very seemingly natural process of when you build weapons of war that's gonna lead to more war.
Speaker 2
37:16
Like it pulls you in somehow.
Speaker 1
37:20
Yeah, I would say throughout the Cold War and even after the end of it, there has not been a sustained conversation in the United States about our defense establishment, what we really need, and what serves our interest, and to what extent sort of other things like market forces, profit motives, belong in that conversation. What's interesting is that in the generation after the First World War, that conversation was on the table, right? Through a series of investigations in the US, the Nye Committee, in Britain, a Royal Commission, journalistic exposés.
Speaker 1
38:06
You know, this would have been just talked about constantly in the years between about 1930 and 1936, as people were starting to worry, right, that storm clouds were gathering in Europe again.
Speaker 2
38:19
Yeah, but it always seems like those folks get pushed to the fringes. You're made an activist versus a thinking leader.
Speaker 1
38:32
Those discussions are often marginalized, framed as conspiracy theory, et cetera. And I think it's important to realize that in the generation after World War I, this was a serious civic conversation. It led to sort of investigations of defense sort of finance.
Speaker 1
38:53
It led to experiments in Britain and France and public finance of war material. And I think those conversations need to be reconvened now in the 21st century.
Speaker 2
39:05
Is there any parallels between World War I and the war in Ukraine? The reason I bring it up is because you mentioned sort of there was a hunger for war, a capacity for war that was already established and the different parties were just boiling the tensions. So there's a case made that America had a role to play, NATO had a role to play in the current war in Ukraine.
Speaker 2
39:38
Is there some truth to that? When you think about it in the context of World War I, or is it purely about the specific parties involved, which is Russia and Ukraine?
Speaker 1
39:52
I think it's very easy to draw parallels between World War I and the war in Ukraine, but I don't think they really work. That the First World War in some ways is generated by a fundamental conflict in the European system of empires, right, in the global system of empires. So in many ways, if there's a parallel, the war in Ukraine is the parallel to some of the conflicts in the Mediterranean and the Balkans in 1911 to 1913, that then later there was a much greater conflict, right?
Speaker 1
40:42
And so I think if there's any lessons to be learned for how not to let World War III look like World War I, it would be to make sure that systems aren't locked into place, that escalate wars out of people's expectations.
Speaker 2
40:58
Well, that's, I suppose, what I was implying, that this is the early stages of World War III. That in the same way that several wolves are licking their chops, or whatever the expression is, they're creating tension, they're creating military conflict with a kind of unstoppable imperative for a global war. That's, I mean, many kind of people that are looking at this are really worried about that.
Speaker 2
41:33
Now the stopping, the forcing function to stop this war is that there's several nuclear powers involved, which has at least for now worked to stop full-on global war. But I'm not sure that's going to be the case. In fact, what is 1 of the surprising things to me in Ukraine is that still in the 21st century, we can go to something that involves nuclear powers, not directly yet, but awfully close to directly, go to a hot war. And so do you worry about that, that there's a kind of descent into a World War I type of scenario?
Speaker 1
42:17
Yes, I mean, that keeps me up at night and I think it should keep the citizens of both the United States and Russia up at night. And I think, Again, it gets back to what I was saying in that in the summer of 1914 and even then things that looked Like a march toward war Could have been different right? And so I think it's important for leaders to of both countries and of all of the sort of related country, of Ukraine, of the various NATO powers to really sort of imagine off-ramps and to imagine alternatives and to make them possible.
Speaker 1
43:03
Whether it's through diplomacy, whether it's through other formats. I think that's the only way to prevent sort of greater escalation.
Speaker 2
43:15
What's the difference between World War I and the Civil War in terms of how they defined what it means to be an American, but also the American citizen's relationship with the war, what the leaders were doing? Is there interesting differences and similarities? Besides the fact that everybody seems to have forgot about World War I in the United States and everyone still remembers Civil War.
Speaker 1
43:40
I mean, it's true. And, you know, the American Civil War defines American identity in some ways, along with the Revolution and the Second World War, more so than any other conflict. And it's a fundamentally different war, right?
Speaker 1
44:00
It's 1 because it is a civil war, right? Because of secession, because of the Confederacy, this is a conflict happening on the territory of the United States between Americans. And so the dynamics are really quite different, right? So the leaders, particularly Lincoln, have a different relationship to the home front, to civilians, than say, Wilson or Roosevelt have in World War I and II.
Speaker 2
44:30
Also the way you would tell the story of the Civil War, perhaps similar to the way we tell the story of World War II, there's like a reason to actually fight the war. The way we tell the story is we're fighting for this idea that all men are created equal, that the war is over slavery in part. Perhaps that's a drastic oversimplification of what the war was actually about in the moment.
Speaker 2
44:56
Like how do you get pulled into an actual war versus a hot discussion. And the same with World War II, people kind of framed the narrative that it was against evil. Hitler being evil. I think the key part of that is probably the Holocaust.
Speaker 2
45:18
It's how you can formulate Hitler as being evil. If there's no Holocaust, perhaps there's a case to be made that we wouldn't see World War II as such, quote unquote, good war. That there's an atrocity that had to happen to make it really, to be able to tell a clear narrative of why we get into this war. Perhaps such a narrative doesn't exist for World War I, and so that doesn't stay in the American mind.
Speaker 2
45:44
We try to sweep it under the rug, given though overall 16 million people died. So to you, the difference is in the fact that you're fighting for ideas and fighting on the homeland. But in terms of people's participation, you know, fighting for your country, was there similarities there?
Speaker 1
46:10
Yeah, I mean, I think, I mean, the Civil War in both the North and the South, troops are raised overwhelmingly through volunteer recruitment. There is a draft in both the North and the South, but it's not significant. Only 8% of Confederate soldiers came in through conscription.
Speaker 1
46:34
And so in fact, you know, the mobilization for volunteers often organized locally around individual communities or States create sort of multiple identities and levels of loyalty, where people both in the North and the South have loyalty both to their state regiments, to their sort of community militias, and as well to the country. They are fighting over the country, right, over the United States. And so at the end, the Union and the Confederacy have conflicting and ultimately irreconcilable visions of that, but that sort of nationalism that comes out of the Union after the victory in the war is a kind of crucial force shaping America ever since.
Speaker 2
47:21
So what was the neutrality period? Why did US stay out of the war for so long? Like what was going on in that interesting, Like what made Woodrow Wilson change his mind?
Speaker 2
47:34
What was the interesting dynamic there?
Speaker 1
47:38
I always say that the United States entered the war in April of 1917, but Americans entered it right away, right? They entered it, you know, some of them actually went and volunteered and fought almost exclusively on the side of Britain and France. At least 50,000 joined the Canadian army or the British army and served.
Speaker 1
48:02
Millions volunteer, they sent humanitarian aid. I think in many ways, modern war creates modern humanitarianism and we can see that in the neutrality period. And even if they wanted the United States to stay out of the war, a lot of Americans get involved in it by thinking about it, caring about it, arguing about it. And at the same time, they're worried that British propaganda is shaping their news system.
Speaker 1
48:30
They are worried that German espionage is undermining them. They're worried that both Britain and Germany are trying to interfere in American elections and American news cycles. And at the same time, a revolution is breaking out in Mexico, right? So there are sort of concerns about what's happening in the Western Hemisphere as well as what's happening in Europe.
Speaker 2
48:54
So World War I was supposed to be the war to end all wars, and it didn't. How did World War I pave the way to World War II? Every nation probably has their own story in this trajectory towards World War II.
Speaker 2
49:12
How did Europe allow World War II to happen? How did the Soviet Union, Russia, allow World War II to happen, and how did America allow World War II to happen? And Japan.
Speaker 1
49:24
Yeah, you're right, the answer is different for each country, right? That in some ways, in Germany, the culture of defeat, and the experience of defeat at the end of World War I leads to a culture of resentment, recrimination, finger-pointing, blame, that makes German politics very ugly, as 1 person puts it, brutalizes German politics. It places resentment at the core
Speaker 2
49:53
of the populace and its politics.
Speaker 1
49:56
Yeah, and so in some ways that lays the groundwork for the kind of politics of resentment and hate that comes from the Nazis. For the United States, in some ways, the failure to win the peace sets up the possibility for the next war, right? That the United States, through Wilson, is sort of crafting a new international order in order that this will be the war to end all wars.
Speaker 1
50:24
But because the United States failed to join the League of Nations, you see that the United States really sort of on the hook for another generation. In Asia, the story is more complicated, right? And I think it's worth bearing that in mind that World War II is a two-front war. It starts in Asia for its own reasons.
Speaker 1
50:44
World War I is transformative for Japan, right? It is a time of massive economic expansion. And a lot of that sort of economic wealth is poured into sort of greater industrialization and militarization. And so when the military wing in Japanese politics takes over in the 1930s, they're in some ways flexing muscles that come out of the First World War.
Speaker 2
51:09
Can you talk about the end of World War I, the Treaty of Versailles? What's interesting about that dynamics there? Of the parties involved, of how it could have been done differently to avoid the resentment, is there, or again, is it inevitable?
Speaker 1
51:30
So the war ends and very soon, even before the war is over, the United States in particular is trying to shape the peace, right? And the United States is the central actor at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. Woodrow Wilson is there, he's presiding, and he knows that he calls the shots.
Speaker 1
51:51
So he was respected. He was respected, but resentfully in some ways by the European powers, Britain and France and Italy to a lesser extent, who felt that they had sacrificed more. They had 2 goals, right? They wanted to shape the imperial system in order to make sure that their fundamental economic structures wouldn't change.
Speaker 1
52:15
And they also wanted to weaken Germany as much as possible, right? So that Germany couldn't rise again. What this leads to is a peace treaty that, you know, maintains some of the fundamental conflicts of the imperial system and makes, bankrupts Germany, starves Germany and kind of feeds this politics of resentment that make it impossible for Germany to kind of participate in a European order.
Speaker 2
52:46
So people like historian Neil Ferguson, for example, make the case that if Britain stayed out of World War I, we would have avoided this whole mess and we would potentially even avoid World War II. There's kind of counterfactual history. Do you think it's possible to make the case for that?
Speaker 2
53:07
That there was a moment, especially in that case, staying out of the war for Britain, that the escalation to a global war could have been avoided, and 1 that ultimately ends in a deep global resentment. So where Germany is resentful not just of France or particular nations, but is resentful of the entire, I don't know how you define it, the West or something like this, the entire global world?
Speaker 1
53:36
I wish it were that easy. And I think it's useful to think in counterfactuals, what if, And if you believe, as historians do, in causation, then if that 1 thing causes another, then you also have to believe in counterfactuals, right? That if something hadn't happened, then maybe that wouldn't, you know, that would have worked differently.
Speaker 1
54:05
But I think all the things that led to World War I are multi-causal and nuanced. And this is what historians do, we make things more complicated. And so, you know, there was no 1 thing that could have, you know, that could have turned the tide of history, you know, and, you know, oh, if only Hitler had gotten into art school, or oh, if only Fidel Castro had gotten into the major leagues, you know. Those are interesting thought experiments, but few events in history
Speaker 2
54:37
I think are that contingent. Well, Hitler is an example of somebody who's a charismatic leader that seems to have a really disproportionate amount of influence on the tide of history. So if you look at Stalin, you can imagine that many other people could have stepped into that role.
Speaker 2
55:02
And the same goes for many of the other presidents through, or even Mao. It seems that there's a singular nature to Hitler that you could play the counterfactual that if there was no Hitler, you may have not had World War II. He, better than many leaders in history, was able to channel the resentment of the populace into a very aggressive expansion of the military and I would say skillful deceit of the entire world in terms of his plans, and was able to effectively start the war. So is it possible that, I mean, could Hitler have been stopped?
Speaker 2
55:45
Could we have avoided if he just got into art school? Or again, do you feel like there's a current of events that was unstoppable?
Speaker 1
55:55
I mean, part of what you're talking about is Hitler the individual as a sort of charismatic leader who's able to mobilize, you know, the nation. And part of it is Hitlerism, right? His own sort of individual ability to play, for example, play off his subordinates against 1 another to set up a system, you know, of that nature that in some ways escalates violence, including the violence that leads to the Holocaust.
Speaker 1
56:23
And some of it is also Hitlerism as a leader cult. And we see this in many other things where a political movement surrounds 1 particular individual who may or may not be replaceable. So yes, the World War II we got would have been completely different if a different sort of faction had risen to power in Germany. But Europe, you know, Depression-era Europe was so unstable and democracies collapsed throughout Western Europe over the course of the 1930s, you know, whether they had charismatic totalitarian leaders or not.
Speaker 2
57:05
Have you actually read 1 book I just recently finished? I'd love to get your opinion from a historian perspective. There's a book called Blitzed, Drugs in the Third Reich by Norman Oler.
Speaker 2
57:17
It makes the case that drugs played a very large, meth, essentially, played a very large role in World War II. There's a lot of criticism of this book, saying that it's, kind of to what you're saying, it takes this 1 little variable and makes it like this explains everything. So everything about Hitler, everything about the blitzkrieg, everything about the military, the way, the strategy, the decisions could be explained through drugs, or at least implies that kind of thing. And the interesting thing about this book, because Hitler and Nazi Germany is 1 of the most sort of written about periods of human history, and this was not, drugs were almost entirely not written about in this context.
Speaker 2
58:07
So here, along this semi-historian, because I don't think he's even a historian, he's a, a lot of his work is fiction. Hopefully I'm saying that correctly. So he tells a really, that's 1 of the criticisms, he tells a very compelling story that drugs were at the center of this period and also of the man of Hitler. What are your sort of feelings and thoughts about, if you've gotten a chance to read this book, but I'm sure there's books like it, that tell an interesting perspective, singular perspective on a war?
Speaker 1
58:43
Yeah, I mean, I have read it, and I also had this sort of eye-opening experience that a lot of historians did. And they're like, why didn't we think about that? And I think whether he's, the author Oler is sort of not a trained academic historian, but the joy of history is like, you don't have to be 1 to write good history.
Speaker 1
59:05
And I don't think anyone, you know, sort of criticizes him for that. I like the book as a window into the Third Reich. You know, Of course, drugs don't explain all of it, but it helps us see the people who supported Hitler, the ways in which it was that mind-altering and performance-altering drugs were used to kind of keep soldiers on the battlefield, the ways in which, you know, I think that we don't fully understand the extent to which the Third Reich is held together with like duct tape from, you know, from a pretty early phase by like 1940 or 41 even. You know, it's all smoke and mirrors and I think that wartime propaganda, both Germans trying to say, you know,
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